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DEFENDING AND PROTECTING GENDER EQUALITY AND 
THE FAMILY UNDER A DECIDEDLY UNDECIDED 
CONSTITUTION IN ZIMBABWE*
Welshman Ncube
Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Zimbabwe, Harare
INTRODUCTION
Zimbabwe is party to virtually all international human rights instruments which oblige 
countries to inter alia, protect and promote the family and family life for the benefit of its 
members; guarantee women equality with men during marriage and at its dissolution; 
guarantee women equal rights and responsibilities with men in marriage and family 
relations; and guarantee equal rights and responsibilities between men and women 
regarding the entry into marriage, ownership, management and disposition of property 
within and without marriage. Since independence the state has sought to reform family 
laws with a view to granting women and children rights and protection, particularly against 
those traditional and customary practices which are perceived as unjustifiable. However, 
the approach to these issues has been uneven and sometimes inconsistent and muddled. 
On the other hand, social reaction, particularly from elders and traditionalists has often 
been sharp, aggressive and resistant.
The objectives of this paper are to review, analyse and evaluate, within the framework of 
the country's obligations under international human rights treaties, Zimbabwe's legislative 
reforms which have been directed at achieving gender equality and the general protection 
of women and children within the family. Also evaluated are the social reactions to some 
of these changes which have struck at the core of traditional rights, norms and values. This 
paper tells the story of how Zimbabwe has grappled, even though sometimes inconsistently 
and incoherently, with the complex issues relating to the co-existence of not only a formal 
plural system of laws but also a plural and highly contested system of norms and values. 
Modern and Western inspired values on equality between men and women, on the rights 
of children have clashed with "traditional" and "customary" values on the same matters. 
The legislative reforms in the field of family law have thus resembled a Western dance to 
the sounds of traditional drums and music in what may be described as a dance trapped 
between the slippery slopes of modernity and quicksands of tradition and customary law.
Depending on which side of the debate commentators have found themselves in there 
have been two broad and opposed views on many of the family law reforms. One view, 
encapsulated in the resistance of chiefs, traditional leaders and elders, has seen some of 
the reforms as a dangerous game sweeping Africans down the uncontrollable torrents of 
Western values which have poisoned African culture and torn asunder African traditional 
values which acted as a glue holding together not only the African family but also the 
African cultural way of life. The other view has seen some of the changes as half-hearted, 
weak and too little often too late by a state muddled and trapped in the quicksands of 
tradition. Noneof these extremes represent reality. They are, however, important ideological
A shorter version of this paper was written for and presented at the International Society of Family 
Law, Ninth World Conference, on Changing Family Forms: World Themes and African Issues, held 
in Durban, South Africa, 27-31 July, 1997.
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posturings by the activists on either side of the debate, one seeing the reforms as inadequate 
and too little and the other seeing them as simply too much too quickly. This paper attempts 
to look at the reality from a less polarised perspective while capturing the essence of the 
social reactions to the reforms as represented by the disputants in the debate. The reality is 
essentially that the constitution of Zimbabwe, although amended recently to incorporate a 
prohibition of gender discrimination, remains decidedly undecided on whether or not the 
principle of gender equality should extend to all aspects of social life.
THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK
Before discussing the constitutionalisation of gender equality and family law reform within 
the context of the protection of women and children's rights in family law it is instructive 
to give a general overview of those provisions of the various international human rights 
instruments which are relevant to gender equality and the reform of family laws in 
Zimbabwe. Firstly, there is Article 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights which declares the family to be the "natural and fundamental group unit of society" 
which is entitled to protection by society and the state and also obliges States Parties to 
take all appropriate steps to ensure "equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to 
marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution".1
Secondly, the African Charter on Human and People's Rights ("the African Human Rights 
Charter") is more robust and emphatic about the importance of-the family in its Article 18 
which states that:
(1) The family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall be protected by 
the State which shall take care of its physical and moral health.
(2) The State shall have the duty to assist the family which is the custodian of morals 
and traditional values recognised by the community.
(3) The State shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women 
and child as stipulated in international declarations and conventions.
Article 29 places a duty on all individuals to preserve the harmonious development of the 
family and to work for its cohesion.2
Thirdly, there is Article 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women ("the Women's Convention") which mandates States Parties 
to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters 
relating to marriage and family relations and in particular to ensure, on the basis of equality 
the equality of men and women, inter alia:
(i) the same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution;
(ii) the same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their marital status, in 
matters relating to their children;
(iii) the same rights and responsibilities with regard to guardianship, wardship trusteeship 
and adoption of children,-3
1 See also the Preamble to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and Article 18 of the Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the African Child.
2 See also Article 31 of the Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the African Child.
3 See also Articles 2 and 8(1) of the Convention on The Rights of The Child which when read together 
are to the same effect, namely that children should have the same rights vis-a-vis their parents 
regardless of their status. The equivalent provisions in the Charter on The Rights and Welfare of the 
African Child are Articles 3 and 20.
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(iv) the same rights as husband and wife, including the right to choose a family name;
(v) the same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition, management, 
administration, enjoyment and disposition of property; and
(vi) all necessary action, including legislation, shall be taken to specify a minimum age 
for marriage and to make the registration of marriages in an official registry 
compulsory.
Thirdly, under Article 15 States Parties are required not only to ensure that women and 
men are equal before the law but also to accord to women the same legal status or capacity 
as that applicable to men. Fourthly and finally Article 5 requires States Parties to take all 
appropriate measures to "modify the social and cultural patterns of men and women, with 
a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices 
which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on 
stereotyped roles for men and women".
When read together, all these provisions of international human rights instruments which 
have a bearing on the family and family law, mean no more than that the body of family 
laws must recognise and implement the equality of men and women in family and 
matrimonial matters from the formation of marriage, through their personal and property 
rights during marriage and their rights and obligations in relation to their children to their 
rights and obligations upon dissolution of marriage by divorce or death. The question that 
then arises and which is discussed and assessed throughout this paper is the extent to 
which the body of Zimbabwe's family laws, both at customary law and general law, have 
been reformed to be in line with the country's obligations under the various international 
human rights treaties referred to above and to all of which Zimbabwe is a party.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK, THE FAMILY AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS
That national constitutions represent a powerful value framework which is used to link 
international human rights standards to national law is today well accepted,4 even in Africa 
with its historical legacy of one party state constitutions which were described as 
constitutions without constitutionalism5 and which at that time often bore a pale 
resemblance to the reality of political practice. Today, the importance of Constitutions in 
protecting fundamental rights in the new democratising Africa, particularly in East and 
Southern Africa, cannot be over-emphasized. Thus in presenting issues of gender equality, 
family rights and children's rights one has to begin by charting the Constitutional framework 
within which such rights are protected and are to be understood.
The Declaration of Rights in Zimbabwe's Lancaster House Constitution largely belongs to 
the old fashioned Westminster given post-colonial type of declaration of rights and hence, 
like its Botswana counterpart, did not until last year (1996) specifically provide for gender
4 See, for example S. Goonesekere, "The Best Interests of the Child: A South Asian Perspective" in P. 
Alston (ed), T h e  B est  In te r e s t s  o f  T h e  C h ild : R e c o n c i l in g  C u ltu re  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h ts , Clarendon, Oxford 
1994, 117-149, at pl45; B. Rwezaura, "Domestic Application of InternationallTuman Rights Norms 
To Protect The Rights of The Girl Child in East and Southern Africa, in W. Ncube (ed), L aw , C u ltu re , 
T ra d it io n  a n d  C h ild ren 's  R ig h t s  in  E a ster n  a n d  S o u th e rn  A fr ic a , Dartmouth, London, 1997; and W. Ncube, 
"Recognition and Monitoring of Children's Rights in Africa: Challenges and Prospects", unpublished 
paper presented at the International Interdisciplinary Course on Children's Rights, Children Rights 
Centre, Universiteit Gent, Belgium, 28 June-5 July, 1997.
5 Okoth-Ogendo, "Constitutions without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an African Political Paradox" 
in I. Shivji (ed), T h e S ta te  a n d  C o n s t itu t io n a lis m : A n  A fr ic a n  D eb a te , Sapes, Harare, 1991, p3.
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equality. It did not even provide for the equality of all Zimbabweans before the law6 and 
hence the clause dealing with the protection of the law did not and still does not embody 
the important value/principle of non-discrimination or put positively the notion of equality 
of all citizens before the law.7 It is also old fashioned in that, unlike the new democratic 
constitutions in the region such as those of South Africa and Namibia, it makes no provision 
for family and children's rights.8
In its original version the non-discrimination clause of the Zimbabwean Declaration of 
Rights namely, section 23, simply outlawed discrimination based on race, tribe, place of 
origin, political opinions, colour and creed but conspicuously absent was any reference to 
sex or gender as a prohibited basis of discrimination.9 This meant that it was possible to 
enact laws which discriminated, for example against women, without offending the 
Constitution. However, in other jurisdictions it has been held that the failure of a 
constitutional provision to specifically mention sex as a prohibited basis of discrimination 
was not to be read to mean that that form of discrimination was permissible. For example, 
in the case of Dow v Attorney-General of Botswana,10 it was held that even though the anti- 
discrimination provision did not specifically mention sex or gender, the Constitution of 
Botswana nonetheless prohibited sex based discrimination since it had to be read and 
interpreted to be in line with the country's obligations under international human rights 
treaties such as the Women's Convention and the African Charter on Human Rights, both 
of which Botswana is a party to. Since these treaties prohibited all forms of discrimination 
including those based on sex or gender, the court reasoned that, while such treaties did not 
confer direct enforceable rights on individuals until national law has been enacted to localise 
them, nonetheless the courts were at liberty to use them as aids to the interpretation of 
ambiguous constitutional provisions. Whatever interpretation the courts chose had to be 
in compliance with the international obligations of the state.11 Virtually the same
6 The relevant provision, departing from international trends, only provided that "Every person, is 
entitled to the protection of the law" whereas equivalent provisions in international human rights 
treaties and comparative constitutions normally provide for the equal protection of all by the law or 
simply for the equality of all before the law.
7 More modem Constitutions in the region unequivocally provide for equality of all before the law. For 
example, section 9(1) of the South African Constitution states that "Everyone is equal before the law 
and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law". See also Article 10 of the Namibian 
Constitution which is to similar effect.
8 For example, Sections 28 and 23 and Article 15 of the South African, Malawian and Namibian 
Constitutions respectively incorporate most of the essentials of children's rights found in the 
Convention on The Rights of the Child. Section 22 and Article 14 of the Malawian and Namibian 
Constitutions respectively, and in line with international human rights treaties, recognise the family 
as the natural and fundamental group unit of society which is entitled to protection by society and 
the state. The Namibia provision goes even further to recognise the equal rights between men and 
women as to marriage, during marriage and at the dissolution of marriage.
9 Similarly worded constitutions include thosdof Kenya and Botswana. As a result of this constitutional 
loophole it became necessary to enact various provisions in different statutes outlawing sex based 
discrimination. Such clauses w ere/are found in such statutes as, in te r  a l i a ,  the Labour Relations Act, 
the Education Act, the University of Zimbabwe Act and the Immovable Property (Prevention of 
Discrimination) Act. See also generally J. Stewart, W. Ncube, M. Maboreke and A. Armstrong, "The 
Legal Situation of Women in Zimbabwe" in J. Stewart (ed) T h e  L e g a l  S itu a t io n  o f  W om en  in  S ou th ern  
A fr ic a , University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 1990,167, at ppl69-170.
10 [1992] LRC (Const.) 623 (CA).
11 This approach to Constitutional construction was in line with the Bangalore principles and the Harare 
Declaration adopted by Commonwealth judges and Commonwealth African judges respectively as 
aids to the interpretation of human rights legislation. The Bangalore principles are to the effect that;
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approach was adopted by the Zambia High Court in the case of Sara Longwe v International 
Hotelsj12
The Zimbabwean Supreme Court had a golden opportunity to adopt and develop this 
technique in Rattigan and Others v Chief Immigration Officer and Others'3 but the opportunity 
was lost because the court chose to decide the matter on other grounds. It had been argued 
in that case that, even though section 23 of the Constitution did not specifically mention 
sex as a prohibited basis of discrimination, section 11 of the Constitution did mention that 
all persons were entitled to the fundamental rights set out in the Constitution without 
regard to inter alia sex and therefore, section 23, being ambiguous, had to be interpreted so 
as to be consistent with the country's obligations under the Women's Convention which 
prohibited sex based discrimination. The case of Dow was cited in support of this approach 
since Zimbabwe had not specifically incorporated the Women's Convention into domestic 
law as is required by section lllB.(i)b of the Constitution before it could be applied directly 
in domestic courts. Unfortunately, in its judgement the Supreme Court did not even make 
reference to these arguments and made no pronouncements at all, even in obiter dicta, relating 
to these issues. It chose to decide the case solely on the ground that the exclusion of the 
foreign husbands of the applicant Zimbabwean women were unconstitutional on the basis 
that they offended the protection of freedom of movement in section 22 of the Constitution. 
Thus regrettably a golden opportunity to broaden our jurisprudence on the incorporation 
of international human rights standards on issues of gender equality was lost.14
In 1996 following several years of lobbying and activism by women's organisations, 
particularly during the run up to the Beijing Women's Conference and thereafter, the 
government of Zimbabwe, through section 9 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment 
(No.14) Act, finally amended section 23 of the Constitution to specifically include gender 
discrimination as a form of constitutionally prohibited discrimination. However, for reasons 
which will become apparent below, the prohibition is not as comprehensive as it could 
have been and does not go as far as do other constitutions in the region. All that the 
amendment did was to add the word "gender" in the provisions which list the prohibited 
forms of discrimination so that section 23(1) and (2) now reads:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section —
(a) No law15 shall make any provision that is discriminatory either of itself or in 
its effect; and
(b) no person shall be treated in a discriminatory manner by any person acting 
by virtue of any written law or in the performance of any public office or any 
public authority.
(i) where a treaty has been ratified but not as yet incorporated into national/domestic law, its principles 
would nonetheless be used by the courts as aids to constitutional, statutory, and/or common law 
interpretation in the event of ambiguity; and (ii) when interpreting statutes, including Constitutions, 
judges should interpret them in such a way that they are consistent with the country's obligations 
under human rights treaties.and Conventions.
12 [1993] 4 LRC 221. For a fuller discussion of this technique in Constitutional interpretation see B. 
Rwezaura, o p  c i t  note 4 and W. Ncube, o p  c i t , note 4.
13 1994 (2) ZLR 54 (SC). *
14 For a brutal and trenchant criticism of the R a t t ig a n  judgement see L. Madhuku, "Magic and 
Constitutional Interpretation: A Case Note on R a tt ig a n  a n d  O th ers  v  C h ie f  Im m ig r a t io n  O ffic e r  a n d  O th ers"  
L eg a l F o r u m , 1994 Vol.6, No.3, 9.
15 Law is defined in section 113 as including statutory enactments, the Roman Dutch common law and 
customary law. However, as will be seen below, the potential of this provision being used to challenge 
discriminatory principles of law is greatly diminished by a later provision which places virtually the 
whole of family law outside the reach of the provision.
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(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a law shall be regarded as making a provision 
that is discriminatory and a person shall be regarded as having been treated in a 
discriminatory manner if, as a result of the law or treatment, persons of a particular 
description by race, tribe, place or origin, political opinions, colour, creed or gender 
are prejudiced —
(a) by being subjected to a condition, restriction or disability to which other 
persons of another such description are not made subject; or
(b) by the according to persons of another such description of a privilege or 
ad van tage w hich is not accord ed  to persons of the first-m entioned  
description; and the imposition of that condition, restriction or disability or 
the according of that privilege or advantage is wholly or mainly attributable 
to the description by race, tribe, place of origin, political opinions, colour, 
creed, or gender of the persons concerned.
Even though this formulation is relatively wide on the question of non-discrimination as a 
principle it is not as comprehensive and broad in its recognition of women's rights as 
comparable provisions of other constitutions in the region. The Constitution of Malawi for 
example has a two pronged approach to the issues of gender equality which two approaches, 
when taken together, comprehensively lay down the principle of equality and non­
discrimination. In the first place, section 20 provides that:
(1) Discrimination of persons in any form is prohibited and all persons are, under 
any law, guaranteed equal and effective protection against discrimination on 
grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
nationality, ethnic or social origin, disability, property, birth and other status.
Even though this provision can be said to comprehensively outlaw sex or gender based 
discrimination, section 24 goes further to provide specifically for women's rights and gender 
equality by providing that:
(1) Women have the right to full and equal protection by the law, and have the right 
not to be discriminated against on the basis of their gender or marital status which 
includes the right:
(a) to be accorded the same rights as men in civil law, including equal capacity —
(i) to enter into contracts
(ii) to acquire and maintain rights in property, independently or in association 
with others regardless of their marital status;
(iii) to acquire and retain custody, guardianship and care of children and to have 
an equal right in the making of decisions that affect their upbringing; and
(iv) to acquire and retain citizenship and nationality.
(b) on the dissolution of marriage —
(i) to a fair disposition of property that is held jointly with a husband; and
(ii) to fair maintenance, taking into consideration all the circumstances and, in 
particular, the means of the former husband and the needs of any children. 2
(2) Any law that discriminates against women on the basis of gender or marital status 
shall be invalid and legislation shall be passed to eliminate customs and practices 
that discriminate against women, particularly practices such as:
(a) sexual abuse, harassment and violence;
(b) discrimination in work, business and public affairs; and *
(c) deprivation of property, including property obtained by inheritance.
This Constitutional formulation of women's rights and gender equality is so comprehensive 
that it would subject to the constitutionality test virtually the entire body of family law 
whether under the common law or customary law or statutory law. In Zimbabwe it would 
bring, for example, the marital power, customary inheritance laws, polygyny, custody,
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guardianship and matrimonial property rights laws, be they customary, common law or 
statutory law, under the constitutionality test. Unfortunately, Zimbabwe's Constitution 
does not have any constitutional provision that approximates section 24 of the Malawi 
Constitution.
As if the failure of Zimbabwe's Constitution to comprehensively make provision for gender 
equality and women's rights in marriage and within the family was not enough, section 23 
specifically provides for a host of exceptions which effectively place the whole area of 
family law and customary law outside the scope of the constitutionalisation of gender 
equality. Firstly, subsection 5 states that a law may discriminate against women to the 
extent that it "takes due account of physiological differences between persons of different 
gender except as far as that law . . .  is shown not to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society". It remains to be seen how the courts will interpret this exception to the principle 
of gender equality. All that may be said at this stage is that historically many of the 
discriminatory practices against women have been justified and defended on the basis of 
women's physiological differences with men. Clearly, in the hands of a sexist government 
and a sexist judiciary, this provision opens wide the possibilities of discriminating against 
women, particularly within the field of family law.
Secondly, and more ominously, are the exceptions to gender equality provided for in 
subsection (3) which reads in part:
(3) Nothing contained in any law shall be held to be in contravention of subsection
1(a) to the extent that the law in question relates to any of the following matters:
(a) adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on death or other 
matters of personal law;
(b) th e ap p lica tio n  of A frican  cu sto m a ry  law  in an y case  in v olv in g  
A fricans. .  ,.14
This provision effectively excludes the principle of gender equality from the whole area of 
family law and customary law and hence the various provisions of the Roman-Dutch 
common law, customary law and statutory law which discriminate against women in 
marriage and outside marriage within the whole area of family law are not constitutionally 
challengeable. Clearly, the Zimbabwean constitutional provisions on gender equality fall 
far short of the country's obligations under international human rights treaties, particularly 
Article 16 of the Women's Convention which, as we have seen above, obliges States Parties 
to ensure that men and women have the same rights during marriage and at its dissolution 
and indeed outside marriage in matters such as guardianship, custody and adoption of 
children. Also under Article 15 States Parties are obliged to ensure that women and men 
are equal before the law in all respects. Remember too that Article 23 of the Civil and 
Political Rights Covenant mandates States Parties to ensure equality of rights and 
responsibilities of spouses.
Notwithstanding the Constitution's failure to comprehensively protect women's rights, 
the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe has, seemingly half-heartedly, attempted to read broadly 
some of the fundamental rights recognised and protected in the Constitution to advance 16
16 See also Articles 17 and 23 and sections 82 and 15 of the Constitutions of Ghana, Zambia, Kenya and 
Botswana respectively which contain similar exceptions on adoption, marriage and other aspects of 
personal law as well as the application of customary law. See also M w a z o z o  v  M w a z o z o  SC 121/94  
where, in te r  a lia , it was held that the application of customary law with all its iniquities and in particular, 
discrimination against women in the laws of inheritance was saved by paragraph (b) of subsection 3 
of section 23 as quoted here (at pp 6-7).
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women's rights, gender equality and to protect the integrity of the family. The leading 
cases in this regard are Rattigan and Others v Chief Immigration Officer and Others (supra) and 
Salem v Chief Immigration Officer and Another.'7 However, there have also been lost 
opportunities and failures to protect the integrity of the family and women's rights such as 
in the case of RuwodoN O v Minister of Home Affairs and Others'8 and In re Wood and Another.'9
In the Rattigan case the Chief Immigration Officer had refused to grant the alien husbands 
of the three women applicants, who were all citizens of Zimbabwe, permanent residence 
in Zimbabwe. Following that refusal the applicants petitioned the Supreme Court for an 
order declaring that their rights as citizens under inter alia section 22 (which protects freedom 
of movement) of the Constitution were being breached by the refusal. In finding in favour 
of the applicants on this issue the Supreme Court relied on the marriage bond and the 
need to protect the family and hence its conclusion that to exclude the husbands from 
Zimbabwe had the effect of placing the applicants in the invidious position of having to 
choose either to leave Zimbabwe to reside with their husbands elsewhere or to effectively 
bring the matrimonial relationships to an end by remaining in Zimbabwe. In the course of 
the judgement the court observed that:
Marriage is a juristic act s u i  g e n e r i s .  It gives rise to a physical, moral and spiritual 
community of life —  a consortium o m n is  v i t a e .  It obliges the husband and wife to live 
together for life (more realistically, for as long as the marriage endures) and to confer 
sexual privileges exclusively upon each other. Conjugal love em braces three 
components: (i) e r o s  (passion); (ii) p h i l ia  (companionship); and (iii) a g a p e  (self-giving 
brotherly lo v e ). . .  The duties of cohabitation, loyalty, fidelity, and mutual assistance 
and support, flow from the marital relationship. To live together as spouses in 
community of life, to afford each other marital privileges and to be ever faithful, are 
the inherent commands which lie at the very heart of marriage . . .  M arriage,. . .  is one 
of the basic rights of man, fundamental to our very existence and survival.17 8920
The Court went on to make reference to Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, both 
of which afford protection against interference with family life and emphasise the 
importance of preserving and protecting established family ties. Cases decided by the UN 
Human Rights Committee21 and the European Court of Human Rights22 protecting the 
integrity of family life, including the preservation of and respect for the relationship of 
husband and wife were cited with approval. The reliance by the Supreme Court on 
provisions of international human rights treaties protecting the integrity of family life as 
aids to the interpretation of the right of freedom of movement protected in Zimbabwe's 
Constitution was, of course, inspite of the fact that Zimbabwe's constitution does not have 
any provision protecting family life, family ties and marriage. Realising this the court 
justified its approach as follows:
Although there is no provision in the Constitution of Zimbabwe which equates directly 
to Article 17 of the Covenant or Article 3(1) of the Convention, S ll guarantees every
17 1994 (2) ZLR 287 (SC).
18 1995(1) ZLR 227 (SC).
19 1994 (2) ZLR 155 (SC).
20 Atp61.
21 See for example, A u m e e r u d d y -C z ifr e  a n d  O th ers  v  M a u r it iu s  (1981) 66 In te r n a t io n a l L a w  R e p o r t s  255.
22 S e e  A b d u  L a z iz  C a b a le s  a n d  B a lk a n d a li  v  U K  (1 9 8 5 )  7 E H R R  4 7 1 , B a rr eh a b  v  N e th e r la n d s  (1989) 11 EHRR 
322, M o u s la y u im  v  B e lg iu m  (1991) 13 EHRR 802 and B e ljo u d i v  F r a n c e  (1992) 14 EHRR 801.
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person 'protection for the privacy of his home'. Taken in conjunction with S22(l) and 
interpreting the whole generously and purposively so as to eschew the 'austerity of 
tabulated legalism', I reach the conclusion that to prohibit husbands from residing in 
Zimbabwe and so disable them from living with their wives in the country of which 
they are citizens and to which they owe allegiance, is in effect to undermine and devalue 
the protection of freedom of movement a c c o r d e d  t o  e a c h  o f  t h e  w iv e s  a s  a  m e m b e r  o f  a  
f a m i l y  u n i t 23 (my emphasis).
In Salem v Chief Immigration Officer and Another (supra) the Supreme Court not only upheld 
its reasoning in Rattigan based on the protection of the family unit and marriage but went 
further to hold that since married parties have a reciprocal duty to support each other, an 
alien husband resident in Zimbabwe could not be prevented from taking up employment 
in Zimbabwe so as to support his family. To prevent him from working would have the 
effect of compelling him and his family to leave Zimbabwe and go elsewhere where both 
spouses could work to support each other and this would amount to a violation of the 
citizen wife's freedom of movement as she would effectively have been compelled to leave 
Zimbabwe so as to be in a country, with her husband, where he would be allowed to work. 
In the Court's own words:
It has long been recognised that there is a reciprocal duty of support as between 
husband and wife . . .  The duty . . .  endures st a n t e  m a t r im o n io .  It depends on the one 
spouse's need for support and the other's ability to provide it. In practice, however, 
the primary duty of maintaining the household rests upon the husband . . .  It is he 
who has to provide the matrimonial home as well as food, clothing, medical and dental 
care, and whatever else is reasonably required . . . .
It follows, in my view, that unless the protection guaranteed under section 22(1) of 
the Constitution embraces the entitlement of a citizen wife, residing permanently with 
her alien husband in Zimbabwe, to look for partial or total support, depending on her 
circumstances, t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  h e r  u n q u a l i f i e d  r ig h t  to  r e m a in  r e s id in g  in  t h i s  c o u n t r y ,  a s  a  
m e m b e r  o f  a  f a m i l y  u n i t ,  i s  p u t  in  j e o p a r d y u  (my emphasis).
In In Re Wood and Another (supra) the Supreme Court refused to extend the protection of the 
integrity of the family and family life to two alien women, one married to but separated 
from a Zimbabwean citizen and the other formerly married to a Zimbabwean and residing 
with her Zimbabwean citizen child. In this case there were two women applicants. The 
first woman had been married to a Zimbabwean man but had been divorced. She had a 
son, Martin who was a citizen of Zimbabwe by birth and whose custody she had been 
awarded at divorce. She sought to argue that she could not be excluded from Zimbabwe as 
that would force Martin, a Zimbabwean citizen, to accompany her to wherever she went 
or to remain alone in Zimbabwe without a home and a guardian and thereby infringing 
Martin's right to freedom of movement. Counsel for the first woman, Mrs Wood, had argued 
that" . . .  in order both to avoid impairing, if not destroying, the family unit and to preserve 
and not circumscribe the exercise by Martin of the freedom of movement afforded him 
under S22(l) of the Declaration of Rights, it is essential that Mrs Wood live with her son in 
Zimbabwe; a situation that will persist until Martin attains majority"23 45 The Court rejected 
this argument essentially holding that only citizens and permanent residents had a 
constitutional right to reside permanently in Zimbabwe and hence, Mrs Wood, as a non­
23 At pp64-65.
24 At pp.291-292.
25 Atp.158.
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citizen and non-permanent resident had no right which could be infringed. Only her son, 
Martin, as a citizen "might claim that his right to reside in Zimbabwe was being infringed 
by the expulsion of his mother as he would be forced to accompany her in order to avoid 
separation from his mother and this would interfere with his freedom of movement". 
However, the Application before the Court had not been made by Martin or on his behalf.
For substantially the same reasons, the second woman, Mrs Hansard's application also 
failed, because she was an alien who was estranged from her Zimbabwean citizen husband. 
It was, the Court reasoned, only Mr Hansard, her husband, who might argue that the 
expulsion of his alien wife from Zimbabwe was infringing his freedom of movement as he 
would be obliged to accompany her to establish a matrimonial home outside Zimbabwe in 
order to maintain the marital relationship. But then Mr Hansard was not before the Court 
and he was not complaining. In the Court's own words:
. . .  it is not Mrs Hansard who has the requisite locus standi to complain of a threatened 
or actual contravention of S22(l) of the Declaration of Rights. This protection relates 
to her husband and not to her.26
In Ruwodo v Minister of Home Affairs and Others (supra) an application brought by a 
Zimbabwean citizen minor child represented by her alien mother, to stop the expulsion of 
the mother from Zimbabwe also failed, even though it had been brought by a Zimbabwean 
citizen child seeking to keep his family (i.e. mother) in Zimbabwe. The Court, which had 
implied in In re Woods, that if the son had been the Applicant he might have succeeded, 
apparently had no sympathy for the very argument it had appeared to support in In re 
Woods. It now reasoned that since the minor child, as an infant, was not sui juris and devoid 
of understanding and therefore incapable of exercising volition, any decision by the parent 
that the child should live with her in another country effectively overrides that child's 
constitutional right to remain in Zimbabwe. While Mrs Ruwodo (the applicant's mother), 
as guardian of the applicant, had the right to assert Michael's right to reside in Zimbabwe, 
she had to do so in good faith as the right attached to the child and not to her. As such it 
had to be shown that it was in the child's interests to remain in Zimbabwe rather than go to 
another country with his mother. The Court concluded that there was no evidence that it 
was in the child's best interests to remain in Zimbabwe. What was clear was that Mrs 
Ruwodo, with whom the Court had no sympathy,27 was making use of the child's "rights 
as a tool to achieve her own ends — to avoid her being returned to the United States".28
Surprisingly, in both In Re Wood and Ruwodo the Court did not seek guidance from 
international human rights treaties from which it would have found provisions in favour 
of the applicants.29
26 At p.160.
't? Apparently the court took a dim view of the fact that Mrs Ruwodo had had 5 children from 4 different 
fathers, 4 of whom were born out of wedlock and that she was destitute and dependant on the state 
and hence the unkind and perhaps unjudicious remark: ". . . Mrs Ruwodo . . .  is endeavouring to 
make use of Michael's rights to avoid being returned, with the children, to the United States of America. 
Not one word is spoken about why it is in Michael's best interests to remain living in Zimbabwe. He 
has no formative ties here, having been cast aside by the Wong family (the child's paternal family). 
Moreover Mrs Ruwodo is an undesirable person in Zimbabwe. She has had five children from four 
different fathers, four of them born out of wedlock" (at pp 232-33). The Court went so far as to suggest 
that Mrs Ruwodo's marriage (which had since been dissolved) to Mr Ruwodo, a Zimbabwean citizen, 
may have been one of convenience.
28 At p.232.
29 See, for example, Articles 8, 9 and 10 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
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The decision in Rattigan and Others v Chief Immigration Officer and Others (supra) in so far as 
it recognised the right of Zimbabwean women to reside with their alien spouses without 
being subject to the discretionary powers of the immigration authorities was found 
unacceptable by the executive which responded by causing Parliament to enact The 
Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.14) Act 1996 which inter alia, amended section 
22 of the Constitution to state that the right to freedom of movement shall not exclude the 
power of the state to exclude from Zimbabwe any non-citizen whether or not he/she is 
married to a citizen or permanent resident of Zimbabwe.30
When the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.14) Bill was published it was widely 
criticised by women's organisations, human rights organisations and academics. The thrust 
of the women's organisations' criticism was that the attempt to reverse the ruling in Rattigan 
was discriminatory in that foreign women married to Zimbabwean men would continue 
to have a right, not only to enter Zimbabwe as of right, but to be citizens by virtue of only 
the marriage. The government responded, not by withdrawing the offending provisions, 
but by arguing that if women wanted equal treatment with men the government would 
amend section 7 of the Constitution to also deprive male citizens of the right of their alien 
wives to automatic entry into Zimbabwe. Accordingly, by the time it was enacted the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.14) Act had a provision amending section 7 in 
such a way as to prospectively take away the right of alien wives married to Zimbabwean 
men to be granted Zimbabwean citizenship upon application.31 Somewhat surprisingly, 
some may say naively, some women's organisations and human rights organisations 
applauded this as a victory of their lobbying efforts and as one more nail in the coffin of 
gender discrimination. Any serious analysis and view would have disclosed that there 
was nothing to celebrate and every reason to mourn, for what had happened was that the 
government had somewhat arrogantly, and maliciously refused to retain the rights which 
were being defended, but instead chose to take away more rights in the name of achieving 
non-discrimination. Men lost their rights in the struggle for equality with women. The 
idea that a much broader denial of rights could be applauded as a victory is, at the least, 
shortsighted and at worst naive. But that is exactly what happened until much later when 
it dawned on some of the human rights organisations that the government's "concessions" 
had been nothing but a gimmick which gave women stones rather than bread and worse 
of all took away the bread crumbs on male plates so as to ensure equality in hunger.
What will happen in practice is that the immigration authorities will continue to allow 
alien wives of Zimbabwean men virtual free entry into the country while alien husbands 
will be closely vetted, which is exactly what the immigration authorities always wanted 
and had been doing in the past. It is extremely improbable that the wife of any Zimbabwean 
citizen will ever be denied entry and residence in the country. So much then, for the 
celebrations of gender neutral constitutional provisions.
yAs we have seen, the constitutional framework in Zimbabwe fails to comprehensively 
provide for gender equality particularly in the field of family law. There is also a failure to 
guarantee the integrity of the family, women's rights in general and children's rights.
What remains is to have an overview analysis of the ordinary legislative interventions 
which have been introduced in the post-independence period to address some of the gender 
inequalities that exist in family law. In this respect, I propose to look at legal pluralism and 
conflict of laws, capacity, marriage and property rights in marriage.
30 See section 8(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.14) Act.
31 See section 4 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.14) Act.
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LEGAL PLURALISM AND MARRIAGE
Zimbabwe, like most former colonies in Africa, has a legal system characterised by legal 
pluralism in that customary laws, the Roman-Dutch common law and statutory law32 are 
all recognised and enforceable within the judicial system. These systems of law intersect, 
interact and interface resulting in a multiplicity of complications as individuals seek to 
maximise their rights by tracking from one system to the other in the regulation and 
organisation of their lives.
The post-independence state crafted a choice of law process designed to achieve the 
maximum degree of flexibility based on social criteria in the determination of which system 
of law to apply to a particular case.33 34The existence of customary law and general law 
means that the rights of Zimbabweans in family law matters will vary depending on whether 
the general law or customary law applies. Clearly, therefore, it is impossible in these 
circumstances to have equality of rights when different systems with different rules may 
be invoked to determine disputes in family law. The differences are well illustrated by the 
laws of marriage which recognise or partly recognise three different types of marriages, 
namely, the general law civil marriage contracted and registered under the provisions of 
the Marriage Act, Chapter 5:11M whose consequences are governed by the Roman-Dutch 
common law and statute law; the registered customary marriage contracted and solemnized 
under the provisions of the Customary Marriages Act, Chapter 5:07 whose consequences 
are governed by customary law except where customary law has been specifically ousted 
by statute;35 and the unregistered customary union which is technically an invalid marriage 
and therefore without legal consequences except that for specific purposes it is recognised 
or treated as if it were a valid marriage.36 Such purposes include the status of the children 
born out of such unions, their rights in respect of guardianship, custody and inheritance;37 
the reciprocal duty of the "spouses" to maintain each other,-38 the surviving spouse's claim 
for loss of support in the event of the unlawful killing of the other spouse;39 the husband's 
claim for adultery damages,40 and, when the Administration of Estates Amendment Act, 
1997 comes into force, the inheritance rights of each of the spouses from each other's estates.41 
The post-independence state has, through legislative amendments, extended greater 
recognition to customary law unions42 and the Supreme Court has, by a process of
32 The Roman-Dutch common law and statute law are collectively known as the general law.
33 See sectidh 3 of the Customary Law (Application) Act, Chapter, 8:05, W. Ncube, F a m ily  L a w  in  Z im b a b w e , 
LRF, Harare, 1989, at pp3-24, D. Galen, "Internal Conflicts Between Customary Law and General Law 
in Zimbabwe: Family Law as a Case Study", Z L  R ev , Vols 1 and 2,1983-84,3 and B. Donzwa, W. Ncube 
and J. Stewart, "Which Law? What Law? Playing with the Rules" in W. Ncube and ]. Stewart (eds) 
W id o w h o o d , In h e r it a n c e  L a w s , C u s to m s  a n d  P r a c t ic e s  in  S o u th e rn  A fr ic a , WLSA, 1995, Harare, pp 73-107.
34 Every Zimbabwean regardless of race may contract this type of marriage which is monogamous.
35 Only Africans are permitted to contract this Jype of marriage which is potentially polygynous.
36 An unregistered customary marriage is invalidated by section 3(1) of the Customary Marriages Act. 
/  See also W. Ncube, (1989), note 33 above; at p. 134-137; C h o t o v M a t iy e ,  1974 RLR 302 and K u r a m b a k u w a
v  M a b a y a  SC 158/87.
37 Section 3(5), Customary Marriages Act, [Chapter 5:07].
38 Section 6(3), Maintenance Act, [Chapter 5:09],
39 Z im n a t  In s u r a n c e  v  C h a w a n d a , 1990 (2) ZLR 143 (SC).
40 C a r m ic h a e l  v M o y o ,  1994 (2) ZLR 176 (SC).
41 See section 2 of the Amendment Act.
42 See, for example, section 6(3), Maintenance Act, [Chapter 5:10] section 2, Income Tax Act, [Chapter 
-23:061 and section 2, Administration of Estates Amendment Act, No. 6 o f 1997.
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interpretation which I have described elsewhere as magical and mystical43 also extended 
the recognition even further.44
However, in spite of this extended recognition, a customary union still has no proprietary 
consequences at "divorce".45 In any event, the parties cannot divorce each other as they are 
in law not validly married.46 The continued extended recognition of unregistered customary 
marriages is contrary to the country's obligations under the Women's Convention, which 
as seen earlier, requires States Parties to ensure that all marriages are registered in an official 
registry.47 Also problematic and inconsistent with both notions and principles of gender 
equality is the continued recognition of the polygynous nature of customary marriages 
and unions. What is even more disturbing are the new provisions of the Administration of 
Estates Amendment Act, 1997 which seek to turn civil monogamous marriages into 
polygamous ones for the purposes of inheritance in all those circumstances where a civil 
marriage was preceded by a customary union with another woman. Thus where a man 
first "marries" one woman in a customary union and then marries another in terms of a 
registered civil marriage, for purposes of inheritance upon his death, the two women will 
both be treated as his widows and thereby effectively render the subsequent civil marriage 
a polygynous one. The creation of endless legal opportunities for the recognition of 
polygynous marriages is evidently contrary to the country's obligations under international 
human rights treaties already cited above.
CAPACITY, EQUALITY AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
The Women's Convention, as already seen, mandates states parties, in Article 15, to accord 
to women, in civil matters, a legal capacity identical to that of men and the same 
opportunities to exercise that capacity.48 In colonial Zimbabwe, the capacity of Africans 
was always determined by reference to customary law49 which was held by the colonial 
courts to render African women perpetual minors, always under guardianship, either of 
their fathers, if unmarried, or that of their husbands, if married.50 Almost immediately 
after independence the new government rectified this by enacting the Legal Age of Majority 
Act,51 No 10 of 1982 which came into force on 10 December, 1982. At the time of its enactment,
43 W. Ncube, "Magic and Mysticism as Aids to Statutory Interpretation: The Case of the Judicial 
Recognition of Customary Law Unions in Zimbabwe" Z L  R e v , 1995, Vol.12.
44 See judgements in Z im n a t  I n s u r a n c e  v  C h a w a n d a , (supra) and C a r m ic h a e l  v  M o y o  (supra). For a fuller 
discussion of these cases and why they are technically indefensible see W. Ncube, note 43 above.
45 Thus the equitable redistributive powers of the courts under section 7 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 
[Cap 5:13] are inapplicable.
46 J o s e p h  T in ga  v  J o s h u a  S h e k e d e  19^0 A AC 30.
47 See Article 16(2).
48 The Article goes further to require that women be given "equal rights to conclude contracts and to 
administer property" and shall be treated equally with men at all stages of procedure in courts and 
tribunals.
49 The colonial Legal Age of Majority Act'Chapter 46 did not apply to Africans as it was expressly 
excluded from so applying. See also section 3 of the African Law and Tribal Courts Act, Cap 237 
which was repealed soon after independence by the Customary Law and Primary Courts Act, No.6 
of 1981.
50 For a fuller discussion see W. Ncube, "Released from Legal Minority: The Legal Age of Majority Act 
in Zimbabwe" in A. Armstrong and W. Ncube (eds) W om en  a n d  L a w  in  S o u th e rn  A fr ic a , ZPH, Harare, 
1987,193, and A. Armstrong, "Zimbabwe: Away from Customary Law" J o u r n a l  o f  F a m ily  L a w , (1987), 
Vol.II, 339.
■ 51 Today the provisions of the Legal Age of Majority Act have been inconspicuously tucked away by the 
Law Revisor under the umbrella of an innocuous statute entitled the General Law Amendment Act, 
Cap 8:07.
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few could have imagined not only the profound effects this simple five section statute52 
would have on numerous areas of personal laws but also the widespread national 
controversy it would cause. As it has turned out, few statutes in the history of Zimbabwe 
have caused as much controversy as the Legal Age of Majority Act and fewer still have 
affected so many aspects of the law and people's lives. The courts have used the Act to 
decide a wide range of issues ranging from ordinary capacity to inheritance issues. In 
Jenah v Nyemba53 54it was held that the effect of the Act was to grant African women full legal 
capacity embracing contractual capacity, locus standi injudicio, and proprietary capacity.
In Katekwe v Muchabaiwa54 it was held that the full contractual capacity possessed by African 
women meant that they could, if above 18 years, enter into marriage contracts without the 
assistance of their parents. This has profoundly affected the very nature of customary/ 
African marriage systems which are based on the authority of the family, particularly over 
women's marriage capacity.55 In Katekwe v Muchabaiwa, it was also held that, without 
guardianship over a woman above 18 years, an African father could no longer sue for and 
recover seduction damages upon the seduction of his major daughter. This ruling meant 
that one of the principal legal leverages parents had over the sexuality of their daughters, 
was being pulled from under their feet. The unclaimability of seduction damages upon the 
seduction of major daughters and the capacity of "children", particularly daughters to 
marry without parental consent and therefore without lobola caused the most resistance to 
the Act from parents and the elders in general. The Act was then widely condemned as 
unAfrican and uncultural. All sorts of social problems, ranging from teenage indiscipline 
and pregnancy through prostitution and the high rates of divorce to baby dumping were 
all conveniently blamed on the Legal Age of Majority Act.56 Up to today parents throughout 
the country passionately blame the Act for practically every perceived social evil having 
anything to do with the youth and sometimes having nothing to do with them, such as the 
perceived disintegration of the traditional African family which was, in the past, supposedly 
stable and protective of its members.57 58
Also affected by the Legal Age of Majority Act was section 13 of the Customary Marriages 
Act which provided that the property rights of African spouses were always to be 
determined by reference to customary law regardless of whether or not they had a general 
law marriage. In Mujawo v Chogugudza58 the Supreme Court held that section 13 was 
inconsistent with the notion of the full capacity of women, particularly when read with the 
flexible choice of law criteria in section 3 of the Customary Law (Application) Act. This has 
meant that those Africans who have contracted non-customary marriages have the property 
consequences of their marriages governed by the general law which gives women better
52 The Act simply made provision that every person shall attain the age of majority on attaining 18 
years of age and that this provision "shall apply for the purpose of any law, including customary 
laws". See also A. Armstrong, o p  c it  note (50) at p.345.
53 1986 (1) ZLR 138 (SC).
54 1984 (2) ZLR 112 (SC).
55 See A. Armstrong e t  a t, "Uncovering Reality: Excavating Women's Rights in African Family Law" 
In te r n a t io n a l J o u r n a l  o f  L a w  a n d  th e  F a m ily , 7 (1993) 314-369 at pp 316-317.
56 For a fuller discussion see W. Ncube, "Dealing With Iniquities in Customary Law: Action, Reaction 
and Social Change in Zimbabwe, In te r n a t io n a l J o u r n a l  o f  L a w  a n d  T h e F a m ily , 5, (1991) 58-79, at pp 66- 
70 and W. Ncube, (1987) op  c it  note 50.
57 See generally W. Ncube, e t  a l ,  C o n t in u ity  a n d  C h a n g e : T h e  F a m ily  in  Z im b a b w e , WLSA, 1997, Harare.
58 1992 (2) ZLR 321 (SC).
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inheritance rights upon the death of their husbands as compared to customary law which 
completely excludes the surviving spouse from the inheritance process.59
In Chihowa v Mangwende60 the Legal Age of Majority Act was held to have removed the 
disability of daughters from inheriting from their fathers and hence where the daughter is 
the eldest surviving child she is the heir to her deceased father's estate.*1 However, the 
widow in Murisa v Murisa62 could find no joy in the provisions of the Legal Age of Majority 
Act as it was held that a widow could never inherit from her deceased husband at customary 
law and this disentitlement had nothing to do with whether she was or was not capable of 
majority status.63
It is clear that in terms of capacity Zimbabwean law recognises that women and men have 
the same legal capacity, except for the woman married in community of property (which 
marriage regime is extremely rare in Zimbabwe) who still falls under the husband's Roman- 
Dutch common law marital power and is thereby disabled in respect of capacity to 
administer the joint matrimonial estate arising out of the community of property.64 Another 
capacity related problem is that, under section 15 of the Deeds Registries Act, Cap 20:05, a 
woman married in community of property is required to be assisted by her husband in 
dealing with the registration of any document relating to immovable property. Before this 
section was amended in 1989 it used to require all married women to prove their capacity 
before they could participate in any registration or conveyancing processes involving 
immovable property.
Article 16(h) of the Women's Convention requires that married women and men enjoy the 
same rights "in respect of ownership, acquisition, management, administration and 
enjoyment and disposition of property". In Zimbabwe, the bulk of women's lack of equal 
rights with men are to be found in the laws regulating access to and control of matrimonial 
property. Firstly, in respect of freehold immovable property, even though women have the 
same capacity as men to acquire and own freehold tenure property, because of their unequal 
access to education, skills training, employment and credit, they often are unable to take 
benefit of their proprietary capacity as they have limited financial resources to purchase
59 See generally K. Dengu-Zvobgo, In h e r ita n c e  in  Z im b a b w e : L aw , C u s to m s  a n d  P r a c t ic e s ,  Sapes, Harare, 
1994.
60 1987 (1) ZLR 228 (SC).
61 See also J. Stewart, "The Legal Age of Majority Act Strikes Again" Z im b a b w e  L a w  R e v ie w ,1986, Vol.4, 
168; W. Ncube, C u s to m a r y  L a w  o f  S u c c es s io n  in  Z im b a b w e , paper delivered at WLSA seminar, Kadoma, 
1991; and K. Dengu-Zvobgo, e t  a t , note 59 above, Chapter 2. Note also that subsequent cases (M w o z o z o  
v  M w o z o z o  SC-121 -94 and V areta  v  V areta  1992 (2) ZLR1) have pushed back the frontiers drawn by the 
C h ih o w a  judgement, by holding that the eldest daughter will inherit only in the absence of male issue. 
In fact, in M w o z o z o  the court expressed the view that minority and majority status have nothing to do 
with customary principles of inheritance which are determined by the patriarchal nature of 
Zimbabwean society and not women's ldgal capacity.
62 1992 (1) ZLR 167 (SC).
63 See J. Stewart "Untying the Gordian Knot: M u ris a  v  M u r is a ; A Little More Than a Case Note", L eg a l  
F o r u m  (1992) Vol.4, No.3, p.8 and L. Madhuku, "Is custom customary law? The Case of M u r is a  v  
M u r is a  and a reply to Mrs Julie Stewart" Legal F o ru m , (1993) Vol.5, No.l, 32.
64 For fuller details see W. Ncube, The Matrimonial Property Rights of Women in Zimbabwe, MPhil 
thesis, UZ, Harare, 1986, Chapter 3; W. Ncube, F a m ily  L a w  in  Z im b a b w e , LRF, Harare, 1989, Chapter 
10; W. Ncube, C o m p a ra t iv e  M a tr im o n ia l  P ro p e r ty  S y s tem s , University of Oslo, Oslo, 1989, at pp 49-71; 
and W. Ncube, "Underpriviledge and Inequality: The Matrimonial Property Rights of Women in 
Zimbabwe" in A. Armstrong and W. Ncube, (eds) W om en  a n d  L a w  in  S o u th e rn  A fr ic a , ZPH, Harare, 
1987.
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freehold tenure property either in the form of urban houses or commercial farms.63 Secondly, 
in relation to communal land (where the great majority of African families live) landed 
property is formally allocated by District Councils in terms of customary principles65 6 which 
provide that land will be allocated to a married man and shall be held by him. Women 
have no independent access to this type of land and have access only derivately as wives 
and hence upon divorce they have to leave the land and settle elsewhere; either in urban 
areas or return to their natal homes.67 In respect of resettlement land, which is a new land 
tenure system invented after independence, the criteria for settlement favours men in that 
priority is given to married men in whose name the resettlement permits are issued and 
thus exposing wives to the same problems as faced by those in communal areas upon 
divorce. That is to say, they have to leave the resettlement land as the permit belongs to the 
husband. However, widowed women with dependents can be resettled as they also qualify. 
However, in practice very few women do get allocated resettlement land in their own 
right.68 Clearly, Zimbabwean law regulating access to communal and resettlement land is 
discriminatory against married women both in its theory and application and therefore 
falls short of the country's obligations under international human rights treaties.
As to the law regulating matrimonial property in general, section 7 of the Matrimonial 
Causes Act, Cap 37 gives courts discretionary powers to order what they consider to be 
fair and equitable division of the matrimonial assets at divorce. In practice, the approach 
of the courts has been uneven and inconsistent in the application of these provisions mainly 
to the prejudice of women. In practice, rarely do the courts order equal division of 
matrimonial assets. More often than not the husband is given the greater proportion of the 
property.69 What is important though, is that section 7 of the Matrimonial Causes Act has 
displaced both the inequitable customary law property regime which excluded women 
from having a share of matrimonial property at divorce and the general law out of 
community regime which also prejudiced women, the majority of whom either worked as 
housewives or if employed had their income utilised mainly for the subsistence needs of 
the family. However, what is still required is a more equitable matrimonial property regime 
which will ensure that the courts do not exercise their discretionary powers to the prejudice 
of women. In this respect, a presumption of equal sharing displaceable only in exceptional 
circumstances, needs to be established by statute.
CONCLUSION
This paper has shown that the Constitution of Zimbabwe, unlike some of its counterparts 
in the region, fails to create a firm and solid base for gender equality in the field of family 
law and thereby fails to live up to the country's obligations under inter alia, Article 2 of the 
Women's Convention which requires national constitutions to embody the principle of 
equality of men and women. This failure of the Constitution has meant that the array of 
discriminatory and inequitable laws in family law, both at general law and customary law,
65 See generally W. Ncube e l  a l ,  P a r a d ig m s  o f  E x c lu s io n : W om en 's A c c e s s  to  R e s o u r c e s  in  Z im b a b w e , WLSA, 
Harare, 1997.
66 See section 8 of the Communal Lands Act, Cap. 20:04.
67 See generally W. Ncube e t  a l ,  o p  c it  note 65.
68 Ib id .
69 For some of the evidence in proof of this see W. Ncube, (1986) note 64 above; W. Ncube, (1987) note 64 
above; W. Ncube, F a m ily  L a w  in  Z im b a b w e , (1989) note 64 above; W. Ncube (1991) note 56 above; and 
W. Ncube, "Reallocation of Matrimonial Property at the Dissolution of Marriage in Zimbabw e " ,  Jo u rn a l  
o f  A fr ic a n  L aw , (1990), Vol.34, No.l, 1.
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cannot be challenged as falling short of the standard of the Constitution. Such laws exist in 
the regulation of access to communal and resettlement land which exclude women from 
having direct, independent and secure access to land in these tenure systems.
The courts have also not been consistent in upholding the rights of women where 
opportunities of creative and sensitive constitutional and statutory interpretation have 
presented themselves. Evidence of this is to be found in the immigration cases involving 
expulsion of women formerly married to Zimbabweans and in the allocation of property 
at divorce by the courts. However, in other instances the courts have upheld the principles 
of equality such as when applying the provisions of the Legal Age of Majority Act.
Social reaction to some of the legislative changes, particularly those directed at protecting 
women and children from excessive control by male elders, have received sharp social 
reaction resulting in silent resistance whereof families have often sought to opt out of state 
regulation of their affairs, particularly in matters of marriage and inheritance. This has 
tended to blunt the effectiveness of some of the laws intended to benefit women and children 
within the family framework and environment.70 However," notwithstanding the effects, 
the laws have been profound for those prepared and able to assert and defend their new 
rights. Zimbabwe is still a long, long way from some form of gender equality within the 
family both in terms of the theory of law (i.e. principles of law in force) and social practice, 
but a few significant strides have been made in that direction and ultimately the family 
will be the better for it.
70 See generally B. Rwezaura, e t  a l ,  "Parting The Long Grass: Revealing and Reconceptualising The 
African Family" J o u r n a l  o f  L e g a l  P lu r a lis m  a n d  U n o ffic ia l  L a w , (1995), No. 35,25 and A. Armstrong e t  a l, 
'Towards a Cultural Understanding of the Interplay Between Children's and Women's Rights: An 
Eastern and Southern African Perspective", T h e  In te r n a t io n a l J o u r n a l  o f  C h ild  R ig h ts , 3, (1995), 333-368.
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